Reputation and product quality revisited by Esfahani, Hadi S.

UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS LIBRARY
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
BOOKSTACKS
\Z>/~^ L-
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/reputationproduc1584esfa

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 89-1584
Reputation and Product
Quality Revisited
Hadi S. Esfahani
The Libiaiy ui me
AUG \ 1989
Unlvsrslty ol Illinois
of Urtana-ChampalQn
WORKINC; PAPER SERIES ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSHIT IIONS NO. 30
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 89-1584
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana- Champaign
August 1989
Reputation and Product Quality Revisited
Hadi S. Esfahani, Professor
Department of Economics

Abstract
This paper extends Allen's (1984) model of reputation and product
quality in which restrictions on firm size allow positive premia for the
production of high quality products be reconciled with limited entry costs.
We show that dropping Allen's implicit assumption of seller precorami tment to
a price in all future periods greatly strengthens his model and generalizes
the results in significant ways. In particular, the necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium can be relaxed and more
precisely specified. The extended model also yields different results than
those of Allen when applied to evaluate the efficiency of equilibria with
"endogenous" entry costs.

I . Introduc tion
In an Important contribution to the literature on the role of reputation
in solving seller moral hazard in competitive markets, Allen (1984) has
developed a model in which the incentive to produce a high quality product
is maintained by limitations on the size of firms in the market. Allen's
model, however, is solved with an implicit assumption that sellers precommit
themselves to a given price in all future periods. This assumption is not
only highly restrictive in terms of the possible seller strategies, but
makes the existence of equilibrium overly sensitive to the shape of the cost
function as well. In this paper, we show that allowing for the possibility
of "closed-loop" seller strategies greatly strengthens Allen's model and
generalizes his results in significant ways. In particular, the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium can be relaxed
and more precisely specified.
From the seminal work of Klein and Leffler (1981) it is well known that
the "lemons" problem in markets with repeated purchases may be solved if
sellers earn sufficient rents from their continued operation in the market
and buyers use a simple trigger strategy of boycotting sellers who cheat and
continuing to purchase from those who remain honest and make competitive
offers. However, it has been a matter of debate whether in competitive
markets automatic mechanisms exist that can reconcile limited, exogenously
given, sunk entry costs with the necessary premia for high quality produc-
tion. This question is quite important because in the absence of such
mechanisms many markets for high quality products may be failing and policy
measures to correct them may be necessary.
-?-
The early models of quasi-rent dissipation mechanisms in markets with
seller moral hazard and limited entry costs— in particular, Klein and
Leffler's (1981) "nonprice competition" and Shapiro's (1983) "introductory
offer" models—were either inconsistent with rational buyer behavior or
depended on highly restrictive assumptions. In Allen's model, buyers are
assumed to behave more intelligently and be able to infer sellers' incen-
tives for producing high quality products from the price and quantity of
their outputs. Assuming that sunk entry costs are not too small and that
the benefits of cheating increase with the scale of operation, Allen shows
that given some restrictions on the cost function an equilibrium exists
where the scale of each seller's operation is small enough to equilibrate
the benefits of cheating with the entry costs and, therefore, with the
2
present value of quasi-rents in the market.
In the following, we reexamine Allen's model and demonstrate that its
results can be greatly enhanced if his implicit assumption of "open-loop"
seller strategies is changed to one where sellers can change the price,
quantity, and quality of their products in each period. In particular, we
show that an equilibrium exists as long as sunk entry costs exceed the dif-
ferential, recurrent, fixed costs of producing high quality rather than low
quality goods and buyers are willing to pay the going price for such a
product. We also examine the characteristics of equilibria in the presence
of mechanisms that generate endogenous entry costs. Unlike Allen, we find
that such mechanism may enhance the efficiency of equilibria when the
exogenous entry costs are relatively small.
We develop the basic model in Section II under the assumption that each
seller's output is directly observable by buyers. In Section III, we shlow
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that this and some other assumptions of the model can be considerably
weakened. In Section IV, we examine the impact of changes in entry costs,
particularly the role of endogenous entry costs. Section V, finally, con-
tains some concluding remarks.
II . A Model of Reputation and Product Quality
in Competitive Markets
The model developed in this section is a discrete-time abstraction of a
market for a perishable product with infinitely-lived, risk-neutral buyers
and sellers whose reservation utilities are normalized to zero. The product
can be produced with two different qualities; a high quality (H) and a low
quality (L). The recurrent costs of producing x units of quality Q, Q = H
or L, is assumed to be c (x), where c (x) > and c (x) > 0. It is natural
to assume that c,,(x) > c T (x) for all x > 0.
rl L
To allow for the possibility of fixed costs, we assume that lira ~c,-(x)r J x+0 Q
\ 0, but recurrent costs are zero when no output is produced; i.e., c (0) =
0, Q = H,L. Entry to the market, however, involves a one time sunk cost,
S > 0, which is independent of the quantity and quality to be produced.
Since the marginal cost of a high quality product is likely to be
greater than that of a low quality product, we assume
(1) c^(x) > c^(x).
This assumption is not necessary for the existence of equilibria, but Lt
simplifies the exposition, guarantees uniqueness, and helps us derive
interesting additional results in Section III. We maintain this assumption
because it seems to be a reasonable one.
It is assumed that there is a continuum of buyers, N, in the market and
that each buyer can purchase only one unit of the product in each period.
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Let u be buyers' monetary valuation of quality Q, Q = H,L. To simplify the
analysis, we assume that u = and that u is greater than the minimum
L H
average cost; that is,
(2) "H^-Pm^ ' min Pc^'I+F^
x
rS
rS/(l+r)+c
H
(x)
where p (x,- ) = is the average cost of producing x units of1
c 1+r x & k &
the high quality product, given entry cost, S. These assumptions imply
that only the high quality product is worth producing.
At the beginning of each period, each seller announces the price, p,
quantity, x, and quality, q, of his product. Buyers observe all sellers'
offers and then decide where to shop. Once a seller has enough customers to
sell all his output, he chooses the actual quality of his product, Q, and
production and trade take place. If a seller does not attract enough custo-
mers, he does not produce in that period and his existing customers go to
other sellers. At the end of the period, buyers experience the actual
qualities of the products they have purchased and decide whether to boycott
any seller in future periods or not.
Seller moral hazard is introduced into the modeL by assuming that
buyers cannot observe the actual quality of the product, Q, at the time of
purchase. Thus, buyers have to form expectations about the actual quality
of each seller's product based on his advertised offer, (p,x,q), and the
structure of the model, which they are assumed to know. We restrict these
expectations by assuming that they are consistent with perfect equilibrium.
In this section, we assume that the quantity of each seller's output is
observable to all sellers and buyers.
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We seek a pure-strategy perfect equilibrium solution to the above game.
With respect to buyer strategies, we stipulate that they accept an offer if
its expected consumer surplus is at least as great as the expected consumer
surplus of any other offer, including no trade. When a buyer is indifferent
among a number of offers, she chooses one randomly. Finally, if a seller
announces the high quality and delivers the low quality, buyers consider him
dishonest and boycott him in all future periods. Sellers who deliver a
quality equal to or greater than what they announce are considered honest.
A.s will be seen, in the absence of binding legal contracts, boycotting is
the maximum credible punishment that buyers can impose on a seller who
cheats.
We now analyze seller strategies in a typical period, t, given V, the
maximum discounted present value of the quasi-rents that a seller with good
reputation in period t+1 expects to earn from that period onwards. The goal
is to construct the one-period equilibria of the model parameterized by V,
and then characterize the perfect stationary equilibria by finding the
values of V that are consistent with such equilibria. Note that since each
seller can always guarantee himself zero long-term profits and since no
entry barrier except S is assumed, we expect <_ V K S.
Let us begin our analysis of seller strategies in a given period by
examining the options of a seller whose offer (p,x,q) has been accepted.
First, consider the case where q = L. Since in this case the seller main-
tains his reputation and gains V in the future regardless of the quality he
provides, the low quality will be produced.
Next, consider the case where q = H and let r be the common rate of
interest faced by everyone in the market. In this situation, it is easy to
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see that if the seller remains honest, his long-terra expected profits will
be px - c (x) + -r— , while if he cheats, he will gain px - c (x). There-
fore, it is profitable for him to provide the high quality if
(3) -£•> c
R
(x) -c
L
(x).
It is assumed that if the seller is indifferent between cheating and remain-
ing honest, he will choose the latter. Inequality (3) defines a moral
hazard condition which is effectively a constraint on x.
Let x(V) be the highest level of output for which condition (3) is
satisfied. Given (1), it is easy to see that a bounded x(V) exists and
that for all x <! x(V) the seller provides the high quality. Therefore, in a
price-quantity diagram, the moral hazard constraint (MHC) appears as a ver-
tical line (see Figure 1). This is different from Allen's solution where V
is assumed to depend on p and, as a result, the MHC is a curve with a largely
indeterminate shape. In our model, V depends on future offers which need
not be the same as the current one. Thus, the solution of our model is not
only more general, its analysis is also much simpler and, as will be seen
shortly, its existence conditions are considerably weaker.
Since the low quality product has no value for buyers, they will not
accept offers with q = L or those that violate (3) at any positive price.
Thus, if the seller wants to make an acceptable offer with these charac-
teristics, he can do best by setting x = and p = 0. In equilibrium,
therefore, either q = H and (3) holds or no trade takes place.
In the case where trade does take place, the seller sets x such that
short terra profits, px - c (x), are maximized subject to the MHC, given p.
Let x(p,V) be the solution to this problem and define x(p) as the inverse of
-7-
t —
1
i
the marginal cost curve, x(p) = c,, (p), for p > c (0) and as a constant
rl — ri
equal to zero, x(p) = 0, for p < c (0). We have
H
(4) x(p,V) = min[x(p),x(V)].
Note that in the price-quantity diagram x(p,V) is a broken line composed of
a vertical segment at x = 0, an upward sloping segment along the marginal
cost curve for all < x <! x(V), and another vertical segment at x = x(V).
The price corresponding to the upper kink is p,(V) = c,[x(V)].
b H
To analyze the seller's choice of price offer, we need to distinguish
two different situations, depending on the main source of competition for
the seller. First, consider the case where all other sellers in the market--
i.e., those who have already incurred the sunk entry cost—have their own
customers and the seller under consideration only needs to worry about
potential entrants from outside the market. In this case, in order to
attract customers, the seller has to offer a price such that new entrants,
who also follow the best possible seller strategy, cannot earn positive
profits by offering a lower price. Therefore, the equilibrium price must
satisfy
(5) ~^ + px(p,V) - c
H
[x(p,V)] = S.
Let p*(V,S - - ) be the solution to (5). Note that this price is deter-
mined by the point where x(p,V) crosses the average cost curve
V V 3 V
p (x,S - -—— ) = [c (x) + S - ——]/x. As shown in Figure 1, p (x,S - )
c 1+r H 1+r c 1+r
is a U-shaped curve whose minimum, p (S —: ), occurs at the point where it
m 1 + r
crosses the marginal cost curve. If p, (V) > p (S ———), as in Figure 1,b — m 1+r
then the MHC will not be binding and a competitive market equilibrium
will prevail at p*(V,S —rr— ) = P (S ———). If, on the other hand,1 r 1+r ra 1-t-r '
p, (V) < p (S —uT~^ > as ^ n F i§ure 2, then each firm's output will be
restricted by the MHC and the equilibrium price will be o*(V,S — ) =
p
c
U(v),s
--jj^l.
v
It is easy to see that since S —r-;— > 0, the sufficient condition for1+r '
the existence of a unique p*(V,S - ) is x(V) > 0. This condition is
1+r
satisfied if
(0) T|F >limxH) [cH (x) -cL(x)].
Note that the right-hand side of this condition is the differential, recur-
rent, fixed costs of producing the high quality rather than the low quality.
Even if (6) holds and (5) has a solution, an equilibrium with trade may
not exist in this situation if p*(V,S - . ) is too high for buyers. In
fact, for the existence of an equilibrium we need to have u^
_> p*(V,S - . )
,
Moreover, the expectation of the seller about the source of competition must
be correct in the sense that the number of sellers in the market should not
exceed M = N/x[p*(V,S - "jT~)»V*]-
This brings us to the second situation that we need to examine; that is,
~ V
where there are more than N/x[p*(V,S - - ),V] sellers in the market. In
1 + r
this case, the entry costs of the "rival" sellers are already sunk. There-
fore, to attract customers, they are willing to lower their prices to a
level that gives them zero profits in the current period. The equilibrium
price is, thus, determined by
(7) px(p,V) - c
n
[x(P,V)] = 0.
The solution to (7) can be denoted by p*(V,0). Again, p*(V,0) corresponds
to the cross point of x(p,V) and p ( x ,0) and remains finite if (6) holds.
c
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The long-run, stationary equilibria of the model can now be charac-
terized by determining the equilibrium values of V. First, the one-period
no trade equilibrium of the model corresponds to a perfect stationary
equilibrium where V = 0. This is in fact the equilibrium that makes buyers'
threat of boycott credible. Second, when the one-period equilibrium with
trade at price o and quantity x is repeated for infinitely many periods, V
will be equal to [px - c (x)] . Therefore, in the situation where en-
H r
trants are the main source of competition, from (6) we find V = S. In this
case, a perfect stationary equilibrium with trade exists if there are
rS
M* = N/x[p*(S,- ),S] sellers in the market and buyers are willing to pay
the price, p*(S,r—
-), for the high quality product.
If there are less than M* sellers in the market, entry will continue
until the number of sellers reaches M*. However, if there are more than M*
sellers in the market, their competition will drive down the price in each
period to a point where the per-period profits of each seller are zero. As
a result, V = and the long-run equilibrium is again a trivial one with no
trade.
Thus, the model has two equilibria: one with no trade and the other one
with trade. The equilibrium with trade exists when there are M* sellers in
the market and
(8) ^ > p*( S ,-gF).
— rS
As long as assumption (2) holds, (8) will be satisfied if x(S)/x[p (-r-—)] is
ra 1 + r
S
relatively large. This latter condition depends on y—- being sufficiently
larger than the differential fixed costs of producing the high quality
rather than the low quality, lira _[c (x) - c (x)]. Note that these
-in-
sufficient conditions for the existence of a stationary equilibrium are much
weaker and more specific than those required by Allen.
III. Firms' Outputs Not Directly Observable
An important assumption behind the analysis in Section II is that each
seller's output is directly observable by everyone in the market. However,
it is easy to show that the existence of an equilibrium with trade only
4
requires that the ratio of buyers to sellers, N/M, be commonly known. The
argument here is similar to that of Allen, but the results are more general.
rS
Suppose that N/M = x[p*(S,- ),S] and the market is in equilibrium with
1+r
rS
every seller offering the high quality at price p*(S
,
. )
_< u . Consider a
seller who tries to deviate from this strategy in a given period by offering
rS
a price p, < p*(S,- ). He mav be able to increase his orofits by attract-
1 1+r
ing more customers in this way if he can convince buyers that he will have
the incentive to produce the high quality. In that case, the deviating
strategy will be successful and will upset the equilibrium. To see that
this is not possible, first note that if the seller's offer is accepted
and he produces the low quality, his profits will be p,x^ ~ c
T
(x_), where
i-l.
x = c (p,)« On the other hand, if he produces the high quality, he can
Li Li X
expect to earn p,x„ - c,,(x,,) +- , where x,, = c TT (p,). Therefore, ther lH H H 1+r rl H 1
deviating strategy will be successful only if
and
(10) p iXr - cR (xH ) + 1|7 > p*x(p*,S) - cH [x(p*,S)] + T|7 = S.
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We now show that when (10) holds, (9) will be violated. Note that (10) can
hold only if the MHC is strictly binding—i.e., x(p*,S) = x(S) < x(p*)
—
and x > x(S). But, in this situation, given assumption (1),
(11) ^=^[7(5)] -c
L
[x(S)] <c
H
(x
H
) -c
L
(x
H
) -
[c
H (V " C L (XL )] + ICL (\ ) "W <
[C
H (V " C L (\ )] + P 1 (XL " V'
where we have used the facts that x > x and p > c (x), for all x < x , to
Lj CI JL u 1j
arrive at the last inequality. Therefore, the equilibrium is robust.
It is interesting to note that when sellers' outputs are not observable,
an equilibrium with trade may exist even when there are more than
rS
N/x[p*(S , ),S] sellers in the market. Suppose that the number of sellers
in the market, M, is such that each one can only sell x = N/M
_<
rS
x[p*(S,- ),S]. In this situation, it is still worthwhile for sellers to
produce the high quality product if the equilibrium price, p_, is such that
P0*0 ' CHU ) ,'
,
'. C
H
(X } + r[cH (x } " C L (X )]
(12) = cu (x n ) - c. (xn ) => p n =IT L v 0' F x
Q
Note that if xn = x[p*(S ,7-7—') ,S ] = x(S), then p A = p*(S )T—-). But, for x,, <
u l+r l+r u
x(S), p n may be higher or lower than p*(S , -, ) , depending on the shape of theu l+r
cost function. In this case, however, we always have S > [c (x ) - c (x )](l+r)
= [prjX
n
"* c (x
n )] , which implies that no new entrant will find it profit-
able to enter the market. Existing sellers also do not cut their prices
since offers with a price less than p will be worthwhile if they can
attract more than x customers, but in that case the MHC will be violated,
making the offer unacceptable to buyers. The argument in this case is the
-12-
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same as the one made above except that in (9) and (10) must be replaced
1+r
by [p *n " c (x n )]/r. Note that a similar argument applies to any price,
p., higher than but suf f icientliy close to p„ such that [p nxn ~ c (x_)]/r
< c (x ) - c(x ) + p (x -x ) holds for all p that satisfy p x - c (x )Hri L1LK 1 1 ti II H
> p rvxn - c (x~). Therefore, in general, the equilibrium is not unique in
— U U H U
this case.
As Allen notices, the exitence of equilibria in such a model does not
depend on buyers' knowledge of the entire structure of costs. In fact, it
is sufficient for them to understand that there is a maximum buyer-seller
ratio at which sellers can be trusted and that a seller who undercuts his
rivals will have the incetive to produce the low quality if he attracts more
customers than his rivals. In particular, they need not know what the equi-
rSlibrium price, p*(S,- ), should be. When the size of each seller's output
is observable, as in Section II, buyers also need to know x(S), i.e., the
number of customers beyond which a seller will find cheating more profit-
able. These are obviously weaker requirements than the knowledge of both
quantity and price thresholds that Allen finds necessary.
IV. Changes in Sunk Ent ry Costs
In this section, we examine the consequences of changes in sunk entry
costs for the equilibrium of the model in which trade takes place and en-
trants break even. Note that an increase in S always raises the average
cost curve and, at the same time, relaxes the MHC. Therefore, when the MHC
is not binding and the equilibrium is at the minimum average cost, both
price and scale of production rise with S. However, when the MHC is
binding, the upward shift in the average cost curve is combined with an
-13-
increase in x(S), which premies greater economies of scale. ks a result, in
this case, the net change in price is ambiguous.
To find the exact condition under which the price falls with S when the
rS
is binding, we must differentiate the equilibrium condition, —— =1+rMHC
p*x(S) - c [x(S)]. The result is
H
- dp* P*-c;u(s)]
(13) (l+r)x(sre- = r -
,
.
dS c„[x(S)] - c T [x(S)j
-\{
Obviously, dp*/dS < iff
(14) p* > c'(x) + r[c'(x) - c'(x)].
H ri L
Note that p* > c (x) and c, (x) > c (x). Therefore, an increase in sunk
H H L
entry costs will lower the equilibrium price if the average cost of pro-
ducing the high quality product is sufficiently greater than its marginal
cost. This happens in particular when sunk entry costs are relatively small
and the scale of operation is considerably below the one that corresponds to
the minimum average cost. The reason is that in this case, gains in scale
efficiency are so substantial that they outweigh the increased sunk costs of
entry.
The above result is quite interesting because of its implications for
the role of "endogenous" entry costs in supporting the performance of
markets for high quality products. Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that when
exogenous entry costs are too small to support an equilibrium with unre-
stricted firm size, sellers may engage in nonprice competition activities—
such as advertising and investment in non-salvageable assets—that raise the
costs of entry and help sustain higher quasi-rents in the market. Allen
shows that in the context of his model the equilibria induced by such mecha-
nisms are always Pareto dominated by the equilibrium with no endogenous
-14-
entry costs and with firm sizes restricted by a moral hazard constraint.
Our findings, however, indicate a very different result: When exogenous
entry costs are relatively small, additional endogenous entry costs may
raise the efficiency of equilibrium by allowing greater economies of scale.
In particular, when the exogenous entry costs are too low for an equilibrium
with trade to exist, endogenous entry costs may make such an equilibrium
possible.
The nonprice competition mechanisms suggested by Klein and Leffler have
been criticized for their vulnerability to the deviating strategy of sellers
who do not incur the additional sunk costs and claim that because of the
existing quasi-rents in the market they still have the incentive to produce
the high quality. However, Esfahani (1989a) develops a model of "intro-
ductory offers" that give rise to endogenous entry costs in a perfect
equilibrium. In this model, buyers have a slight "brand loyalty" in the
sense that they continue to purchase from the (incumbent) sellers who have
been active in the market in the past unless those sellers cheat or make
offers that are strictly dominated by the offers of new entrants. As a
result, entrants have to charge strictly lower prices than those of incum-
bents to attract buyers. Yet, despite the introductory discount, in
equilibrium buyers are indifferent between the offers of incumbents and
entrants and continue purchasing from incumbents, because they expect
entrants to provide the high quality with a lower frequency than incumbents
do. In fact, if buyers are too optimistic about the quality that entrants
provide, incumbents will not be able to keep their customers and, in turn,
entrants will not find it worthwhile to try to establish themselves as
incumbents by being honest. In equilibrium, buyers' expectations are
rational and sellers fulfill them because they are indifferent between
-15-
cheating and honesty and, as a result, randomize their choice of actual
quality. This mechanism generates endogenous entry costs because buyers
who go to entrants have to be compensated for the loss that they incur as
a result of entrants' lower frequency of the high quality provision.
To combine the above mechanism with the model of Section II, only two of
the model's assumptions need to be modified. We need to assume, first, a
weak "brand loyalty" on the part of buyers as defined above and, second,
randomization of the actual quality decision on the part of sellers whenever
they are indifferent between cheating and honesty. The extended model will
then have perfect equilibria with endogenous entry costs. As we show in the
Appendix, when exogenous entry costs are relatively small, the equilibria
that involve some cheating by entrants Pareto dominate those with no
cheating. This implies that the equilibria with such endogenous entry costs
are quite plausible.
V. Concluding Remarks
The extension of Allen's (1984) model analyzed in this paper shows that
limited entry costs in competitive markets may be reconciled with positive
preraia for high quality products under conditions that are more general and
more precisely specifiable than those found by Allen. The key difference
between the two models is in their assumptions with respect to possible
seller strategies. Whereas Allen implicitly assumes seller precorami traent to
a price in all future periods, in the present paper sellers are allowed to
change all aspects of their offers at the beginning of each period. This
improvement increases the generality of the model, simplifies its solution,
and facilitates its application in other contexts. It also yields dif-
ferent results than those of Allen when used for evaluating the efficiency
of equilibria with endogenous entry costs.
-16-
Notes
For a review and critique of these and other models of quasi-rent
dissipation mechanisms in markets with seller moral hazard see Esfahani
(1989a).
2
"Farrel (1986) also develops a model where the incentives to produce a
high quality product are maintained without "endogenous" entry cost mecha-
nisms. His is a model of a contestable market in which moral hazard
restricts entry rather than firm size. However, in Farrel's model firms are
large relative to the size of the market and entry by each one makes a non-
negligible impact on the market.
3
Note that from the point of view of a seller who expects to earn quasi-
V
rents, V, in the following period, net sunk costs are S - . .
4
If, as in Klein and Leffler (1981), firm size is not at all observable
and individual sellers perceive an infinitely elastic demand at the going
price, the scale restriction mechanism suggested by Allen does not work and
no equilibrium exists unless entry costs are already large or can be raised
endogenously
.
Note that we have implicitly assumed that once the seller reduces his
price, he can sell as many units as he wants. This assumption, however, is
not necessary. For the following argument to be valid, we only need
XL — XH ^ x ^ S ) *
Shapiro also develops a model of "introductory offers" that entail
endogenous entry costs. However, in Shapiro's model, buyers do not have
rational expectations about the quality of products offered by entrants.
Entrants always produce the high quality and offer a discount because buyers
expect them to produce the low quality.
For an example of such an application see Esfahani (1989b), where the
model developed in this paper is used to explain the observed pattern of
quality specialization between large, capital-intensive and small, labor-
intensive firms in LDCs.
-17-
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Appendi x
To apply Esfahani's (1989a) "introductory offer" mechanism in the con-
text of the model developed in Section II, we need to assume that buyers
continue to purchase from the (incumbent) sellers who have sold goods on
the market in the past unless those sellers cheat or make offers that are
strictly dominated by the offers of new entrants. Also, we must assume
that sellers randomize their choices of actual product quality when they are
indifferent between cheating and honesty. These two assumptions give rise
to a continuum of equilibria that can be parameterized by a and y, the prob-
abilities of cheating by incumbents and entrants, respectively.
In the following, we concentrate on the case where a = 1, which indi-
cates the equilibria that Pareto dominate those with a < 1. We take y as
given and write the conditions for a stationary equilibrium. Clearly, when
Y = 1, the equilibrium of the model will be the same as the one established
in Section II. By examining the sign of dp*/dy, where p* is the equilibrium
price charged by incumbents, we can determine the relative efficiency of
equilibria corresponding to different values of y _< 1. p* is the correct
measure of inefficiency because it is equal to the total average costs of
production, including the quasi-rents that are dissipated by the proportion
1 - Y of entrants producing the low quality. Note that entrants expect to
break even and buyers are indifferent between incumbents and entrants.
However, in equilibrium, once a sufficient number of sellers have become
incumbents, buyers continue to purchase from them and no new sellers enter.
Depending on the level of exogenous entry costs, in equilibrium the MHC
may or may not be binding for incumbents and entrants. In fact, because the
price charged by entrants is never greater than the price charged by
-19-
incurabents, three different situations may arise: (1) the MHC is binding
for all sellers; (2) the MHC is binding for incumbents but not for entrants;
and (3) the MHC is binding neither for incumbents nor for entrants. In the
latter situation there is no role for endogenous entry costs and the
equilibrium will be established at the minimum of the average cost curve for
the high quality product.
In both situations (1) and (2), the equilibrium introductory price, p ,
must be such that
(Al) p Q = p* - (1-Y)u„.e H
Also, incumbents' scale of production, x*, is determined by the MHC,
V 1+r
= c (x*) - c (x*), where V = [p*x* - c (x*)] . Therefore,
1+r H L H r
(A2) p*x* = c (x*) + r[c (x*) - c (x*)].
H rl L
Note that in the context of this model, (A2) can be interpreted as a "total
cost function" since it includes a normal return on the total necessary
entry costs, which are equal to the benefits of cheating, cl^(x*) - c (x*).
Also, note that the average cost curve associated with this cost function
is the locus of all potential equilibrium price-quantity pairs. This curve
does not necessarily have a usual U-shape, but it slopes downward when x* is
relatively small. This can be seen by differentiating (A2):
(A3) x*^£ = c^(x*) + r[c^(x*)V(x*)] - p*.
(A3) shows that the equilibrium price falls with the equilibrium firm size
if
-20-
(A4) p* > c'(x*) + r[c'(x*)-c'(x*)]
H n L
As pointed out in the text, this condition is likely to hold when x* is
rS
sufficiently small relative to x[p (- )]. Note that the right-hand side ofJ m l+r
(A4) is the marginal cost associated with the total cost function given in
(A2). Therefore, (A3) simply states that the average cost curve slopes
downward as long as it lies above the marginal cost and that a local minimum
average cost will be reached if the two curves cross, i.e., (A4) becomes an
equality.
In situation (1), the zero profit condition for entrants requires
p*x* - c (x*)
(A5) ~ + p
e
x* - yc
r
(x*) - (1-y)cl (x*)
= S.
If we substitute for p* and p from (Al ) and (A2), we can rewrite (A5) as an
equation that implicitly determines x* in terms of y.
(A6) (l+r)[c
H
(x*)-c
L
(x*)] - S = (1-y){x*u
h
-[c
h
(x*)-c
l
(x*)]}.
Note that the left-hand side of (A6) is the endogenous entry costs neces-
sary to maintain the production of the high quality product at scale x*,
while the right-hand side is the expected loss of utility net of resource
savings as a result of buyers' switching from an established seller to an
entrant.
Differentiation of (A6) then yields
(A7) {(2-Y +r)[c'(x*)-c T'(x*)]-(l-Y)u TI }dx* = -[x*u -c..(x* )+c. (x* ) ]dY •
Since u > c (x) for all x <! x*, clearly dx*/dy < if y is close to L.
Therefore, in this case, dp*/dy > if (A4) holds. In particular, we may
conclude that when exogenous entry costs are relatively small, the
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equilibria that involve a small probability of cheating by entrants Pareto
dominate the one with no cheating. In fact, as y goes down, a locally effi-
cient equilibrium will be reached when either the coefficient of dx* in (A7)
vanishes or x* becomes sufficiently large so that (A4) holds with an
equality.
In situation (2), the zero profit condition for entrants is
(A8)
p*x* - c (x*)
+ Y[p
e
** " c
H
(x*)] - (l-y)[p
e
x
L
- c
L
(x
L
)] = S
where x^ < x* is defined by p c'(x^). Differentiating (Al), (A2), and
(A8), eliminating dp and dx*, and rearranging the terms result in
(A9) {-
[c'(x*)-YP ]L e
p* - c^(x*) - r[c^(x*) - c^(x*)]
+ yx* + (1-y)x }dp*
=
-{(x*-x
L )[p e
- (l-Y)u
R
] + [x*u
R
- c
H
(x*)] + c
L
(x
L
)}dY-
Since x*u^ > c (x*), the entire coefficient of dY will be negative if Y is
H H
close to 1. The coefficient of dp*, on the other hand, is likely to be
positive, particularly if p* is relatively large. Therefore, in this case,
a redcution in y is unlikely to reduce p* and improve the efficiency of the
equilibrium when exogenous entry costs are limited.
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